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Many university classes introduce issues of race and racism – 
topics that are difficult for some people to discuss openly. The ICU 
ELP Program, for example, includes challenging readings on race 
and racism as a focus for class discussion and writing assignments. 
In this article, we discuss an approach to the analysis of race and 
racism that can help students apply their critical thinking skills to 
this important topic. We argue that focusing on the discourse of 
race offers rich opportunities for class discussion and student 
writing. Specifically, we summarize critical discourse analysis, 
particularly its understanding of the concept of “racism,” and we 
provide suggestions and examples for its use in class.   
 
 
University classes at ICU and elsewhere address profound social, political, 
cultural and economic issues of race and racism. The ICU English Language 
Program (ELP), for example, includes six thematic units that form the basis for 
lessons in reading and writing. The six units are: educational values and critical 
thinking; reading literature; culture, perception and communication; issues of 
race; bioethics; and visions of the future. The ELP Reader (ICU English 
Language Program, 2007) includes core readings for each of these topics. 
Lessons for the readings focus on content as well as a wide range of reading and 
writing skills. In this article, we discuss the thematic unit “issues of race” in 
order to identify some of the challenges facing classes in which race is a major 
topic. We distinguish explicit (“old”) and implicit (“new”) forms of racism, 
arguing that implicit forms of racism require a discourse analytical approach to 
analyzing race. We believe that this approach offers provocative opportunities 
for class discussion of race and racism.  
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Race and Racism in The ELP Reader: A Scientific Approach 
 
Three of the four readings about race in The ELP Reader originally 
appeared in the magazine Discover in November, 1994: “The Geometry of 
Race,” by Stephen Jay Gould; “Terms of Estrangement” by James Shreeve, and 
“Race without Color” by Jared Diamond. The fourth reading is Pat Shipman’s 
“Sweeping toward a Racial Abyss,” which includes selections from Shipman’s 
book, The Evolution of Racism: Human Differences and the Use and Abuse of 
Science. Although the readings vary in their content and focus, they comprise a 
complex and well integrated set of readings, which, taken together, spell out key 
ideas about race. These ideas may be summarized as follows: (a) Racial 
categories (e.g., black, white, Asian, African) do not stand up to empirical 
scientific investigation. That is, racial categories are inherently arbitrary, as 
evidenced by the fact that scientific efforts to establish racial categories result in 
multiple and contradictory groupings, even when genetic criteria are used. 
Indeed, racial differences are scientifically so unimportant that the very concept 
of “race” has little or no scientific validity. (b) Nevertheless, as Shipman shows, 
explicitly racist programs such as the eugenics movement in the United States 
and elsewhere and Nazism in Germany have distorted science in order to justify 
repression and violence against racial minorities. To undermine such movements 
and reduce racism, scientific education should focus on the speciousness of the 
concept of race. (c) Implicit in the readings is an understanding of racism as a 
belief system about the relative value of different racial groups, usually with 
“whites” or “Caucasians” at the pinnacle of a racial hierarchy. Within this 
perspective, anyone can be a racist, if they believe that one racial group is 
superior to others. (d) Viewing racism as a belief system about race places 
empirical evidence, logical argument, and education at the center of anti-racist 
efforts. Hence the authors appropriately focus on the scientific analysis of race.  
The writings of Gould, Shreeve, Diamond, and Shipman reveal the 
irrationality of racist ideology by pointing out the weak scientific basis for the 
concept of race and the genetically negligible differences among races. But their 
argument contains a danger in its logic: If we argue that discriminating against 
people on the basis of race is wrong because the concept of “race” does not have 
biological reality, does it follow that racism may be justified if race were a 
biologically salient category? As early as 1963, Ernst Mayr, one of the most 
important developers of contemporary ideas about evolution, aptly addressed the 
problem: 
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Equality in spite of evident nonidentity is a somewhat sophisticated 
concept and requires a moral stature of which many individuals 
seem to be incapable. They rather deny human variability and equate 
equality with identity. Or they claim that the human species is 
exceptional in the organic world in that only morphological 
characters are controlled by genes and all other traits of the mind or 
character are due to “conditioning” or other nongenetic factors . . . 
An ideology based on such obviously wrong premises can only lead 
to disaster. Its championship of human equality is based on a claim 
of identity. As soon as it is proved that the latter does not exist, the 
support of equality is likewise lost (Mayr, 1963, p. 649). 
 
Mayr’s point becomes clear if we look at gender. While biologists may consider 
racial categories to be scientifically irrelevant, all biologists agree that the 
male-female distinction is biologically salient. The differences between men and 
women are systematic, and such differences are found at genetic, biological and 
even neurological levels. Does that make sexism more reasonable than racism? 
Pinker (2002) argues that the case against racism and sexism is a moral 
stance that does not depend on the biological sameness of people: 
 
The case against bigotry is not a factual claim that humans are 
biologically indistinguishable. It is a moral stance that condemns 
judging an individual according to the average traits of certain 
groups to which the individual belongs. Enlightened societies 
choose to ignore race, sex and ethnicity in hiring, promotion, salary, 
school admissions, and the criminal justice system because the 
alternative is morally repugnant. Discriminating against people on 
the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity would be unfair, penalizing them 
for traits over which they have no control. It would perpetuate the 
injustices of the past, . . . rend society into hostile factions and [it] 
could escalate into horrific persecution. But none of these arguments 
against discrimination depends on whether groups of people are or 
are not genetically indistinguishable (p. 145). 
 
The real problem of racism does not lie in racial categories. However flimsy the 
concept of race may be, human beings continue to perceive race, although that in 
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itself is not a problem. The fundamental issue is how we use racial categories in 
our social lives. It may be justifiable and beneficial for a forensic anthropologist 
to use racial categories when identifying a decomposed corpse, as mentioned in 
Shreeve’s article, but using racial categories to limit access to education or jobs 
is not. The key idea is that equality does not require identity, and differences 
need not and should not translate to inequality. 
Still, debunking quasi-evolutionist racist ideology by pointing to the 
falsity of its claims has its own value. False claims made under the guise of 
science need to be refuted not just in science but in popular discourse. However, 
debunking a specific ideology is not sufficient for countering racism, because 
racism is, like humans, omnivorous. Deny it a particular ideological diet (such 
as Blumenbach’s belief in the superiority of “Caucasians,” as described in 
Gould’s article) and it will survive on something else. Thanks to the 
advancement of science and education, Blumenbach’s five-race theory that 
places “Caucasians” as the ideal prototype from which other races have 
degenerated sounds today like the belief that the earth is flat – something 
antique and obviously wrong to a point that is almost comical. Extreme forms of 
racism, such as slavery, violence, and segregation laws, are also relatively 
infrequent today, and such acts are rightly recognized as inhumane and criminal. 
Yet racism persists, not because some people remain stubbornly attached to 
Blumenbach’s theory, but because there are always new ideologies generated to 
fuel racism, whose form also changes over time. Today, forced sterilization and 
the legal denial of civil rights have been replaced by new forms of racism, called 
“symbolic racism,” “everyday racism,” or “new racism” (Barker, 1981); these 
forms of racism are supported by new, subtle racist ideologies. One challenge 
for class discussion of race and racism is to develop a framework for 
understanding these new ideologies and new forms of racism.  
Implicit forms of racism often emphasize alleged aspects of minority 
cultures, such as reliance on welfare, low school achievement, drug use, 
violence, and affirmative action, which, it is believed, come together to form 
pathological cultures that are distinct from “mainstream” white culture. A central 
characteristic of these implicit forms of racism is that they are usually not called 
“racism” at all (see Barker, 1981; van Dijk, n.d.). Instead, the view of minority 
cultures as pathological is allegedly based on observation of reality and 
commonsense knowledge about minority groups. Sociological, linguistic and 
cultural “facts” are called upon to support such views. For example, in the latest 
of his controversial best-sellers, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s 
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National Identity, Samuel Huntington (2004) offers socio-cultural reasons why 
recent Latino immigrants in the United States are (he claims) much less likely to 
speak English than European immigrants of the past: Latinos speak a common 
language, unlike earlier European immigrants who were linguistically diverse; 
Latinos are residentially segregated in the U.S. Southwest and a few major cities 
where Spanish is a working language; Latinos are much less interested than past 
immigrants in cultural assimilation; and Latinos are controlled by activists who 
encourage their cultural distinctiveness and maintenance of Spanish. Huntington 
believes that Latino immigrants’ alleged insistence on speaking Spanish is 
incompatible with the “American dream,” which he considers to be the core of 
American national identity: “There is no Americano dream. There is only the 
American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans 
will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English” (p. 
256).  
While many social scientists (e.g., Rumbaut, Massey & Bean, 2006) have 
demonstrated that the central claims of Huntington’s argument are in fact 
empirically wrong, the popularity of Huntington’s work suggests that its 
“Anglo-Protestant,” English-only ideology (which is not empirically testable) is 
widely held and politically popular. But is Huntington’s work “racist”? Our view 
is that Blumenbach’s quasi-biological ideology, which offered a “scientific” 
justification for 20th century racist practices, is not the sole nourishing source of 
racism. In “The Geometry of Race,” Gould maintains that Blumenbach’s 
five-race system inadvertently laid the foundation of racism, but clearly racism 
did not originate in the early 19th century; indeed, slavery existed long before 
Blumenbach’s theory of race. Rather than developing from a single ideology, 
racism persists through different ages, feeding on whatever ideologies are 
available at the time. For that reason, refuting racist ideology can be a Sisyphean 
task. With the demise of explicit forms of racism like eugenics and Nazism, we 
need a framework for analyzing race and racism that students can use to 
examine work such as Huntington’s. Is such work racist? Why or why not? 
What do we mean by “racism”?  
To summarize: The understanding of racism as a belief system about 
“Caucasian” superiority does not explain why racism persists long after societies 
have dismissed the idea of racial superiority. Indeed, students in class 
discussions routinely recognize the difficulty in defining racism and in 
determining what constitutes racist practices. A productive direction for 
discussion of race is to focus on how racism is expressed, why it persists, and 
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what its social value may be. These questions place discourse rather than 
scientific argument or empirical data at the center of attention. By focusing on 
discourse, we shift attention away from scientific facts about race to ways of 
“talking race,” and their social implications – that is, to the content and forms 
of texts and talk that are produced and circulated in the society, and the way 
such texts and talk are linked to actual social practices. 
   
 
A Discourse Analytical Approach to Race and Racism 
 
One of the most influential theories of racist discourse is that of van Dijk 
(1990, 1993a, 1993b), who works within the framework of critical discourse 
analysis (CDA), which he prefers to call “critical discourse studies.” CDA does 
not refer to a specific method of analysis, but instead is an interdisciplinary 
academic movement of scholars who are committed to social and political 
activism, or who adopt a critical perspective toward public discourse (van Dijk, 
n.d.). CDA is particularly appropriate for class discussion in the ELP and other 
university classes because it encourages the application of critical thinking to 
everyday social life by examining discourse in society: how discourse is 
produced and interpreted, and what function the discourse serves in society (Gee, 
1999). While various methodologies are employed in CDA, an informal, 
qualitative discourse analysis does not require specific knowledge and skills. 
Introducing CDA by encouraging students to collect and critically analyze 
newspaper articles, selections from television and video, and other discourse 
data can help raise students’ awareness of racism as an ongoing social problem, 
not as an atrocity of the past that is on its way to a natural extinction.  
 
 
Key Concepts in CDA 
 
If CDA is to be used in class, we must first have a basic notion of how 
CDA can contribute to understanding race and racism. In this section, we 
introduce some useful ideas from van Dijk’s general theoretical framework on 
discourse, racism, and society. A key focus is “social representations” of 
individuals or groups as “black,” “white,” “Asian,” or other ethno-racial 
categories. The reason for calling them “social” representations is that they are 
shared beliefs, values, norms, attitudes, and ideologies that one needs to have in 
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order to function as a competent member of society. Social representations 
influence individuals’ understanding of specific, personal experience. For 
example, imagine a white, middle-class individual in a park in Los Angeles 
observing a mother and child walking together speaking Spanish. This particular, 
specific event becomes part of personal experience and memory, but that 
experience and memory are fundamentally shaped by the observer’s “social 
knowledge” about Latinos. In this case, the event might register as a case of 
“Latinos holding on to Spanish and refusing to learn English.”  
One type of social representation is stereotypes, which are a central 
concern of CDA. The social representation of Latinos as “holding on to Spanish 
and refusing to learn English” may be considered a stereotype. Stereotyping is 
often viewed as a form of “categorization”; the difference between stereotypes 
and other categories is usually considered to be a matter of accuracy or 
legitimacy. In this view, categorization is a necessary and natural part of human 
cognition, but sometimes it “goes too far,” resulting in an exaggerated, distorted 
or overly negative representation (i.e., a stereotype). From this perspective, 
stereotypical representations are overly broad categories – unfortunate, but 
understandable, and they can be corrected through education and information. 
In contrast to this view, van Dijk, like Pickering (2001), argues that 
stereotyping is a particular and distinctive form of social cognition. In everyday 
life, human beings use categories to understand the world and to act in it. 
Usually these categories are not fixed, but somewhat flexible; they can be 
modified as needed, and new categories can be formed on the basis of new 
information. Stereotypes, on the other hand, are fixed, and they severely limit 
the formation of new categories. For example, racial stereotypes can persist 
despite clear scientific evidence that they are false. Moreover, Pickering (2001) 
points out that stereotypes have certain social value that mere categories do not: 
 
Stereotyping may operate as a way of imposing a sense of order on 
the social world in the same way as categories, but with the crucial 
difference that stereotyping attempts to deny any flexible thinking 
with categories. It denies this in the interests of the structures of 
power which it upholds. It attempts to maintain these structures as 
they are, or to realign them in the face of a perceived threat. The 
comfort of inflexibility which stereotypes provide reinforces the 
conviction that existing relations of power are necessary and fixed 
( p. 3). 
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In other words, the social function of stereotypes is that they help to 
maintain existing social relations. In the example of “Latinos holding on to 
Spanish and refusing to learn English,” an important question is how this 
stereotype is embedded in a broad system of social inequality. From this 
perspective, racism is not a system of beliefs about one group’s superiority over 
another, but a system of group dominance: a system for reproducing unequal 
social relations that sustains the advantages and privileges of the dominant 
group. A corollary is that racism can only be practiced by dominant groups (e.g., 
“whites” in the United States). Although some individual members of 
subordinate groups may espouse a belief in their own superiority, such beliefs 
are not “racist” unless they are part of a larger social system that sustains a 
social hierarchy in which the group is privileged. The view of racism as a system 
of group dominance also goes beyond the simplistic black-vs-white formula and 
encompasses “ethnicism” as well. This perspective enables us to examine racism 
as a broad social problem that permeates many societies, not just those with a 
history of Nazism, slavery or eugenics.    
To summarize: Social groups are composed of people who share a set of 
representations (which may be competing and contradictory) and who use them 
as a basis for interpreting the meaning of events in life and the world in general 
(such as a mother and child speaking Spanish or the effects of immigrants on 
society). These social representations influence how people interpret individual 
events, talk, and text. Racism is a system of group dominance that includes a 
social dimension (everyday discriminatory practices, such as school segregation 
and racial profiling), as well as a cognitive dimension (such as stereotypical 
representations).  
To understand the persistence of racism, we must ask: How are social 
representations communicated and shared? It is here that discourse becomes 
crucial, because discourse works as an interface that connects the social and the 
cognitive (van Dijk, 1990, 1993a). Social representations are acquired, 
communicated and reproduced through various forms of discourse, including 
peer talk, parent-child communication, classroom interaction, lectures and 
discussions in educational institutions, and mass media. Logical scientific 
argument is only one small component in educational discourse. In fact, not all 
forms of discourse are equally significant in their influence on social cognition. 
Van Dijk calls for special attention to the discourses produced by social elites, 
which are “groups in society that have special power resources [such as] 
property, income, decision control, knowledge, expertise, position, rank, as well 
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as social and ideological resources such as status, prestige, fame, influence, 
respect, and similar resources ascribed to them by groups, institutions, or society 
at large” (1993b, p. 44). While elites may directly influence the actions of others 
(e.g., by making political decisions in government or executive decisions in a 
corporation), they also have significant power in shaping public opinion (van 
Dijk, 1993b). Scientists are one group of social elites, but their formal, written 
forms of scientific discourse (such as the readings about race in The ELP 
Reader) play a relatively minor role in supporting or undermining racist social 
representations, since the size of the audience for such texts is very small 
compared, for example, to a national television channel.   
Particularly influential elite discourse includes mass media and political 
discourse, which often overlap. Political leaders appear frequently in the mass 
media, where they routinely define “problems” for others to discuss; in this 
sense, they establish social agendas. Although political leaders often claim that 
their concerns are determined by average people, and indeed political talk and 
public opinion may have a limited reciprocal relationship, elites and the public 
are quite asymmetrical in power. What political actors say has great influence in 
shaping public opinion, as does the mass media that cover such political 
discourse (and more). Formal political debates, newspaper editorials, public 
speeches, and press releases are a few of the types of texts that comprise 
influential forms of elite discourse. 
When we look at race in elite discourse, we need to keep in mind that 
explicit forms of racism (“old racism” [van Dijk, n.d.]), such as violence, 
apartheid, and segregation laws, are rare. The explicit racism of American 
eugenics and German Nazism, for example, no longer has legitimacy in public 
discourse. Yet racism persists (often not termed “racism” at all), and is passed on 
(or “reproduced”) through more subtle forms of discourse. In other words, social 
representations of racial groups in the United States and in other liberal 
democratic states are no longer dominated by traditional racist representations; 
in their place are more subtle (and often “cultural”) stereotypes that are believed 
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Using Critical Discourse Analysis of Race in the Classroom 
 
What are the pedagogical implications of applying CDA to race and 
racism, understanding racism not as a belief system, but as a discourse that 
sustains unequal social relations of power? Three principles can guide lesson 
planning within this framework: (a) Students should undertake their own 
discourse analysis by locating and analyzing racial/ethnic stereotypes and other 
representations. (b) Examples of elite discourse are particularly appropriate for 
analysis, and can be drawn from current events. (c) Examples for analysis 
should be drawn from more than one cultural context. 
(a) When using CDA, the first step is to examine stereotypes and other 
representations. Take the representation of “Latinos holding on to Spanish.” 
What makes this a stereotype is that it is impervious to scientific argumentation. 
A large body of sociolinguistic research has found that Latinos in the United 
States are shifting to English monolingualism by the third generation, like 
immigrants in the early 20th century (Rumbaut, Massey, & Bean, 2006). 
Nevertheless, despite overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary, the 
stereotype that Latinos refuse to learn English is widespread, as in Huntington’s 
book, and this stereotype is the basis for many policies, practices, and laws at 
the local, state, and federal government levels. Such stereotypes are racist if they 
support the political, economic, and social power of English speakers and they 
limit the power of Latinos. For example, a widely adopted educational practice 
in the United States is to test Spanish-speaking children in subjects such as 
social studies and history in English only. A major rationale for this practice is 
that students must be encouraged to use English. Because the students are not 
given the opportunity to display their knowledge in these subjects in a language 
they know, they continue to be categorized as low achievers, and they are 
tracked into vocational education, special education, and low-achiever 
classrooms at a higher rate than they would be if their knowledge were assessed 
in Spanish-language tests (see Neuman & Dickinson, 2001). Thus a stereotype 
about Latinos is the foundation for an educational practice that marginalizes 
Latino children. In van Dijk’s terms, therefore, this educational practice is racist. 
Class discussion can focus on the connections between racial stereotypes and 
public policy, law, and practice, and on students’ views about racism as a system 
of social dominance.  
A similar stereotype is held about immigrants (especially Latinos) as 
criminals. There is wide agreement among social scientists that immigration in 
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the United States lowers crime rates. In fact, the incarceration rate of Mexican, 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan males 18-30 years of age (the most likely group to 
illegally enter the United States) is only 1/8 the rate of native-born Latino males 
who are U.S. citizens, and less than native-born non-Latino white citizens 
(Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007). In large American cities, neighborhoods with higher 
proportions of immigrants have significantly lower crime rates, and mid-sized 
cities with high percentages of immigrants (e.g., border cities in Texas and 
Arizona) have relatively low rates of crime compared to similar-sized cities with 
fewer immigrants. These facts are not new: Lower crime rates have been 
associated with increased immigration since the 19th century. Despite such 
scientific data, however, in national public opinion polls, approximately 
three-fourths of Americans believe that immigrants increase the crime rate (Alba, 
Rumbaut, & Marotz, 2005), and this belief is repeated in many forms of elite 
discourse. Huntington, for example, links Cuban immigrants with crime: “The 
Cubanization of Miami coincided with high levels of crime. For each year 
between 1985 and 1993, Miami ranked within the top three large cities (over 
250,000) in violent crime” (Huntington, 2004, p. 250). In a major address to the 
nation about immigration, President George W. Bush declared in May, 2006, that 
“illegal immigration . . . brings crime to our communities” (White House, 2006). 
Newspaper articles and editorials routinely link immigrants with crime (e.g., 
MacDonald, 2004). Students can easily find examples of such stereotypes in 
public discourse about immigrants. These examples can be the basis for class 
analysis and discussion: Precisely what stereotypes are being presented? What 
laws and public policies are justified with such stereotypes? What alternative 
representations of minorities are present – or possible – in public discourse?  
(b) A second way to use CDA is to focus on elite discourse of current 
events. How is race represented in public discourse about current events? A 
particularly rich source of material is the U.S. presidential campaign of 2008. 
Numerous opportunities for discussion of race and racism are available, 
including television coverage. For example, on CNN’s Cafferty File (September 
16, 2008), viewers were asked to respond by email to the question: “Will Barack 
Obama’s race cost him the White House?” Students can be asked how that 
question differs from the alternative question that could have been asked: “Will 
white racism cost Barack Obama the White House?” In the first question, 
Obama’s race is represented as the possible “cause” of Obama’s defeat, while in 
the second question the problem is explicitly defined as white racism. An 
additional question for discussion is why Obama is “black” when one of his 
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parents (his mother) was “white.” The CNN material also includes viewers’ 
responses to the question. One respondent wrote “When over 90% of 
African-Americans are polled and saying they are voting for Obama, why is 
there no question as to racism being a possible motive of those voters?” This 
example raises the issue of “reverse racism,” or racism among racial minorities. 
Implicit in the concept of “reverse racism” is an understanding of racism as a set 
of beliefs about racial preferences which can be held by any racial group. 
Moreover, reverse racism is often linked discursively with the idealized notion 
that ending racism means creating a “colorblind” society. (That is, racial 
equality means a total disregard of race, an idea that often appears in 
anti-affirmative action discourse.) What is lacking in this discourse of race is the 
CDA focus on power: The issue is not merely whether race is a motivation for 
actions such as voting for a particular candidate. In van Dijk’s terms, voting for 
Obama because he is black is not the same act as voting against him because he 
is black. Only the second action sustains an unequal social hierarchy of white 
privilege. Indeed, within the framework of CDA, “reverse racism” is a 
non-sequitur, and a “colorblind” society is an unattainable ideal that serves to 
maintain existing social hierarchies and to discourage active measures to rectify 
social inequality.   
(c) A third principle is that CDA in the classroom should focus on 
discourse samples drawn from different cultural contexts. One possibility is to 
examine the discourse of immigration in Japan, comparing it to the United States. 
Students can carry out online searches for politicians’ speeches about 
immigration. For example, in 2003, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara 
contributed an essay to the countrywide broadsheet newspaper Sankei-shinbun. 
The essay, titled “Mukashi kentoushi, Ima fufou-nyuukokusya” (“Japanese 
envoys to Tang Dynasty China in the past, illegal immigrants at present”) is an 
attack against illegal Chinese immigrants and their crimes (see Yamagami, 2004). 
Similarly, databases for the Japanese Diet include many speeches and debates 
that focus on immigrants and immigration policies in Japan; many of these texts 
link immigration with crime, as well as with other public policy concerns such 
as national security, public education, and Japanese national identity (Yamagami, 
2004). Again, students can look for stereotypes and other representations of 
Japanese, Chinese, and other social groups, focusing on the content of these 
representations and their use as justifications for public law, policy, and practice.   
 
 




Racism is one of the most challenging topics for class discussion. Andrew 
Hacker, influential author of books about race in the United States (Hacker, 
1992) tries to avoid using the words “racism” and “racist” when he speaks at 
universities: “I’ve discovered that if I . . . use the word ‘racism’ or ‘racist,’ those 
two six-letter words, the whites in the audience freeze. They don’t want to hear 
[them] . . . [I]t’s a strategic matter – never to use the word ‘racist’ because I can’t 
get across what I want to” (Hacker, 2008).  
Given the challenges of talking about race, adopting a scientific approach 
that focuses on empirical evidence and scientific investigation is appealing, 
particularly if it leads to the reassuring and “politically correct” conclusion that 
“race does not exist” and racism is therefore unreasonable and wrong. Yet if we 
claim that race does not exist, how do we engage with the powerful everyday 
experiences of racism that are so fundamental to many people’s lives? How can 
we address racism if we discard the concept of race? One possibility is to 
declare that racism is largely a thing of the past, and that people of color who 
claim to experience racial discrimination are being overly sensitive. CDA offers 
a framework for analyzing this possibility by raising questions such as: On what 
basis can white individuals make statements about the experiences of black 
people? Who decides whether a claim about one’s experience is legitimate? 
What are the social consequences of white people’s belief that they can judge 
the psychological “sensitivity” of black people (or other racial and ethnic 
minorities) they do not know? Most importantly, who benefits from this point of 
view? In seeking answers to such questions, we can apply critical thinking to our 
own discourses of race.  
In discussions of race and in the educational effort to counter racism, 
what truly matters is not what science says, nor whether people can be educated 
to not care about race. To stop talking or thinking in racial terms is not the same 
as achieving racial equality. Indeed, it is possible to create a “colorblind” 
discourse that sustains and reproduces racial inequality. In such a case, probing 
the content of the discourse in search of racial stereotypes would not be enough. 
We must also look critically at what the discourse does in the society, and, in 
turn, what we ourselves do by subscribing to such discourse.  
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